The U S D epartment of Transportation's F ederal R ailroad Administration's (F R A) Of®ce of R esearch and D evelopment has been conducting research into rail equipment crashworthiness. The approach taken in conducting this research has been to review relevant accidents, to identify options for design modi®cations to improve occupant survivability and to apply analytic tools and testing techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of these strategies. Accidents have been grouped into three categories: train-to-train collisio ns, collisio ns with objects, such as grade crossing collisio ns, and derailments and other single-train events. In order to determine the potential effectiveness of improved crashworthiness equipment, computer models have been used to simulate the behaviour of conventional and modi®ed equipment in scenarios based on accidents.
INTRODUCTION
Train accidents can be tragic events, with loss of life and serious injuries. The crashworthiness features of the train are intended to minimize fatalities and injuries if an accident does occur. The purpose of such features is to preserve suf®cient space for the occupants to ride out the collisio n and to maintain the forces and decelerations imparted to the occupants within survivable levels. Structural features of the cars, such as longitudinal strength of the carbody and crush zones at the ends of cars, in¯uence how well the cars preserve the occupant volume during a collisio n and the decelerations imparted to the occupants. Occupant protection features inside the car, such as compartmentalization, in¯uence the forces imparted to the occupants. This paper focuses on the structural features of the cars and the performance of the equipment during train collisio ns and derailments.
Research
The F R A conducts research on rail equipment, track and operation safety. R esearch areas include collisio n avoidance measures such as positive train control and strategies for minimizing operator fatigue, as well as equipment crashworthiness [1] . K eeping the trains separated is the ®rst line of defence in assurin g passenger and operator safety, while equipment crashworthiness is the last line of defence. The information from this research has been used to develop federal safety regulations for passenger equipment, which address emergency preparedness, ®re safety, software safety, brakes, vehicle dynamic performance and equipment crashworthiness [2] . (See a companion paper for a discussion of federal crashworthiness regulations [3] .)
The overall objective of the rail equipment crashworthiness research is to develop design strategies with improved crashworthiness over existing designs. The approach used in conducting this research is illustr ated in the¯ow diagram shown in F ig. 1. Information from train accidents is used in all aspects of this research. The rail equipment crashworthiness research approach is as follows:
1. D e®ne the collisio n scenarios of concern. F or developing crashworthiness, the accidents identify the conditions that, if possible, are to be survived. These conditio ns include the collisio n or derailment speed, the train and other objects, and the track conditions. Some accidents happen under such circumstancesÐfor instance at such great speedÐ that it is a practical impossibility to design vehicles to ensure that occupants survive such collisio ns. Very high-speed collisions require the use of buffer cars or other measures that have not been considered practical. The collisio n scenarios of concern are developed by reviewing the relevant accidents, by statistica lly analysing the accident data, as well as by failure analysis of collisio n avoidance measures [4, 5] . The goal in developing the collisio n scenarios of concern is to develop a limited number of scenarios that bound the range of likely collisio ns. These scenarios are used as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of crashworthiness design options. 2a. D evelop information on the features of existing designs that in¯uence crashworthiness. Information on the design details of the equipmentÐthe geometry of the structure, material properties, welding and attachment details, etc.Ðare developed for use in analytic models and in the development of test articles. The results of accidents include the damage to the equipment, such as structural failure, which in turn indicates the design details for which information must be developed. 2b. D evelop options for design modi®cations. Both modi®cations to existing designs, such as strengthening existing members and providing stronger connections between existing framing members, and clean-sheet designs have been developed. In some instances, potentially effective modi®cations can be directly inferred from accident consequences. In other instances, extensive analysis is required to determine potentially effective crashworthiness strategies. 3. D etermin e the effectiveness of existing design and alternative design equipment. F rom post-accident results, it can be seen how effective the equipment was in preserving the survival space for the occupants and in maintaining the forces and decelerations imparted to the occupants to survivable levels. There are typically gaps and uncertainties in the information available from accidents. Analyses and tests are used to ®ll in the gaps of information available from accidents [6±11]. Analytic models and tests, similar to those developed and conducted for the conventional equipment, are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the alternative designs [6, 8, 12, 13] . 4. Compare the crashworthiness of the alternative designs with the existing designs. F or a given collision scenario of concern, comparisons are typically made in terms of the maximum collisio n speed for which everyone would be expected to survive, or, to support a cost/bene®t analysis, in terms of fatalities and injuries as a function of collision speed.
In order to evaluate the crashworthiness of existing and alternative designs, analytic tools and testing techniques are developed and re®ned. Accidents provide information for comparison with analytic model predictions and help provide some level of assurance of the ®tness of the models. The information available from accidents includes observations of the equipment damage, estimates of initial position and speed of the equipment, and measurements of equipment ®nal positio n. There is also information on occupant injury and fatality, which can be used to estimate the forces and decelerations acting on the occupants. Such information and comparisons are valuable, as rail equipment crashworthiness tests can be prohibitively expensive. While much is often unknown about an accidentÐsuch as the precise collisio n speed and initial conditions for the equip-mentÐanalysis results should, at a minimum, qualitatively reproduce the accident consequences for nominally simila r conditio ns. Testing, typically developed to approximate or idealize accident conditions, provides more detailed information for comparison with analysis predictions. As part of the crashworthiness evaluations, the structural crush behaviours of the individual cars, the dynamic behaviour of the trains and the response of the occupants are evaluated. Structural crush behaviour includes the forces required for crushing of the structure, as well as the mode, or changing geometry, associated with crushing. The dynamic behaviour of the train includes the gross motions of the cars and the interactions of the cars during a collision. The forces and deceleration imparted to the occupants result from the gross motions of the cars and the occupants' consequent interactions with the interior. This paper focuses on carbody crush and train collisio n dynamics. N early direct qualita tive comparisons of the crush of the equipment and the positions of the cars after an accident can be made with analysis predictions. D etailed evaluation of occupant response requires information on the deceleration of the cars, which is not readily evident from the aftermath of an accident. These decelerations must be calculated using collisio n dynamics models developed to simulate the accident. While not addressed in detail here, extensive research has been done on the response of occupants during train collisions [14±17]. F ocusing on carbody crush and train collisio n dynamics also allows a broader range of accident conditions to be addressed in this paper.
Train crashworthiness
The behaviour of the train during a collisio n is in¯uenced by the interactions of the colliding cars, the nature of the coupling between the cars and the crush behaviour of the individual cars. Even in a train collisio n that is nominally head-onÐi.e. the impacting cars are initia lly in-line and their centre-lin es coinci-dentÐone impacting car may override the other or the impacting cars may laterally de¯ect past each other. Override of one car by another is often associated with substantial loss of occupant volume, and consequent fatality. The tendency to override or laterally de¯ect depends upon how the structures of the cars crush and the dynamic responses of the cars in the train to the impact force, as well as the initia l conditions of the impact. The mode of crushing of some car structures may effectively form a ramp, leading to vertical or lateral forces that are suf®cient to cause override or to cause lateral de¯ection. The dynamic motions of the car can potentially contribute to misalignment of the underframes, amplifying the tendency towards override or lateral de¯ection. F or conventional N orth American heavy rail passenger equipment, the couplers between cars can lead to lateral buckling of the trainset as a consequence of a collisio n. When viewed from above, the cars in the train form an accordion pattern. These couplers essentially form a rigid link between cars. When there is a high longitudinal load present, with only a small perturbation, the link formed by the couplers laterally pushes on the ends of the cars. As a result, when the ends of the cars contact, they are laterally offset from each other, and the train adopts a relatively small amplitude sawtooth pattern. Once the cars are misaligned, the high longitudinal force acting on one car exerts a signi®cant lateral component on an adjacent car. Consequently, the train will continue to buckle out into the relatively large amplitude zigzag pattern if there is suf®cient energy from the collisio n. D epending on the severity, this mode may progress until the cars have sideto-side impacts. The results of this behaviour have been observed in accidents [18±20]. The progression of the cars being in-line, to the sawtooth lateral buckling pattern to the zigzag pattern, has been simulated [7] with computational models. The progression from in-line to sawtooth buckling has been observed and measured in detail during testing [10, 11] .
Because the carbody of a typical N orth American passenger car is essentially uniformly strong along its entire length, the structural damage tends to be focused on the colliding cars and those cars immediately trailing the colliding cars. Cars away from the colliding cars often remain structurally intact. It has been shown that signi®cant increases in crashworthiness can be achieved if the cars of a train have an increasing force/crush characteristic; i.e. the more the car is crushed, the greater the load that is required. An increasing force/ crush characteristic can result in the structural crush being distributed among the cars of the train, potentially just crushing the unoccupied vestibules and better preserving the occupied volumes [21±24].
ACCIDENTS
This paper includes descriptions of six passenger train collisio ns and three derailments. Computer simulations have been developed for three of the collisio ns and are referenced. Qualita tive comparisons with the results of analyses have been made for two of the collisions. One of the collisions is currently under evaluation and efforts are being made to determine the likely decelerations experienced by the occupants. The derailments are described more brie¯y than the collisio ns, as detailed information on how passengers are injured in such accidents has not yet been developed.
Passenger train accidents can occur under a wide range of circumstances, but those that can be mitigated by crashworthiness features of the train can be placed into three broad categories:
1. Collisio ns with another train 2. Collisio ns with objects, such as a grade crossin g collisio n 3. Single-train events, such as a derailment F urther classi®cations can be made within each of these categories. F or example, signi®cant differen ces may be expected for a locomotive-led train colliding with another locomotive-led train than for a locomotive-led train colliding with a cab car-led train. Track route alignment can also signi®cantly in¯uence the consequences of a collisio n; the consequences of a head-on collisio n on tangent track may be expected to be signi®cantly different from an oblique collisio n at a switch. Similarly, the consequences of a grade crossing collisio n with a heavy highway truck are likely to be signi®cantly different from a grade crossing collisio n with an automobile. F or all accident types, the collisio n speed can also profoundly in¯uence the consequences of the collisio n. Placing the accidents into categories allows calculation of the likelihood of occurrence for each collisio n category as well as the development of strategies for protecting the occupants in that collisio n category.
Collisions with another train
Train-to-train collision s include collisions between a passenger train and a freight train, as well as collisio ns between a cab car-led train and a locomotive-led train. F our accidents are described in this section: 
S yracuse, N ew Y ork, 5 February 2001
At approximately 11:40 am on M onday, 5 F ebruary 2001 an intercity passenger train rearended a freight train, approximately two miles east of the Syracuse, N ew York train station on Track 1. The freight train was travelling east at approximately 11 km/h (7 mile/h), and at the time of impact, the passenger train was also travelling east, at a speed between 56 and 68 km/h (35 and 42 mile/h). The closing speed at impact was between 45 and 56 km/h (28 and 35 mile/h). The passenger train was on the exit spiral of a 1.58 curve, while the trailing cars of the freight train were on tangent track. The point of impact was close to the transitio n point between the spiral and tangent track. Ten people aboard the passenger train were seriously injured, including a female passenger with a broken femur and a male passenger with a broken wrist and broken ankle. About 50 passengers received less serious injuries, e.g. cuts and bruises. N o one on the freight train was injured.
F igure 2 shows a post-accident schematic. The passenger train was made up of two locomotives, a coach/dinette car and four coach cars, and had a total weight of approximately 4.8 M N (1100 kips). The freight train was made up of 88 loaded cars, four empty cars and two locomotives, and had a total weight of approximately 106 M N (24 000 kips). The trailing cars of the freight train were bulkhead¯atcars carrying lumber. The last car of the freight trainÐthe impacted carÐwas carrying a full load of framing lumber. This car was equipped with a hydraulic draft-cushioning device. At least two more cars of this type and load were ahead of the last car.
There was very little structural damage to the passenger cars. There was some damage to the¯exible bellows between the cars closer to the lead end of the train, associated with the sawtooth lateral buckling of the ®rst four passenger cars. There was also some scarring of the sides of the couplers and their lateral bump stops, also associated with the sawtooth buckling of the cars. The freight cars remained in-line and the track under them did not buckle. The hydraulic cushioning devices may have helped to prevent the cars from laterally buckling, as well as the longer shanks of the freight couplers (compared with passenger couplers) and the greater weight of the freight cars.
F igure 3 shows post-accident photographs of the intercity passenger train's lead locomotive and the freight train's trailin g bulkhead¯atcar. It appears that crushing and displacing of the lumber on the loaded bulkhead¯atcar absorbed most of the collisio n energy. The hydraulic cushioning devices on the trailin g cars of the freight train also probably helped to dissipate some of the collisio n energy. (In effect, it appears that the The draft sill and coupler of the bulkhead¯atcar remained essentially intact, with the body and lading stripped off. The draft sill and coupler of the bulkhead¯atcar acted as a battering ram which tore through the coupler and draft gearbox of the locomotive, which hang beneath the main sill structure of the locomotive. The coupler and the end of the draft sill of the¯atcar impacted the front and top of the lead traction motor and front of the body bolster, helping to pry the truck from the locomotive and to push the truck back into the fuel tank. A lug on the lead truck punctured the fuel tank, causing a hole about the size of a baseball. The body of the locomotive began to climb the bulkhead¯atcar as the¯atcar was crushing.
Efforts are ongoing to reconstruct the trajectories of the cars during this collisio n, the decelerations of the occupant volumes and the forces and decelerations imparted to the occupants. The general behaviour of the carsÐthe sawtooth lateral bucklingÐis consistent with analytic model predictions of train collisio ns under simila r circumstances. It is likely that the environment experienced by the occupants of the passenger cars is simila r to the environment measured in the trailing car during the test of two coupled cars impacting with a ®xed barrier [11, 17] . The impacting car in this test sustained structural crush, while the trailin g car did not. Simila rly, in the accident the colliding equipment sustained structural damage, while none of the other equipment did.
Bourbonnais, Illinois, 15 M arch 1999
At approximately 9:47 pm on 15 M arch 1999, an intercity passenger train travelling at approximately 127 km/h (79 mile/h) struck a highway tractor±trailer truck at a grade crossing, derailed and then collided with an uncertain number of standing loaded freight cars in a siding. A large ®re ensued, fed by the oil and fuel carried by the locomotives. The passenger train was made up of two locomotives, one baggage car and 13 bi-level sleeper cars and coaches, and had a total train weight of approximately 12 M N (2600 kips). The standing freight cars included a gondola car loaded with scrap steel and a covered hopper car loaded with¯y ash, and possibly several other cars. There were 11 fatalities, all of which occurred in the second bi-level car, a sleeper car, most of which have been attrib uted to the ®re. There were 122 injuries, ranging from severe to minor. The train had a total of 216 passengers and crew.
F igure 4 shows a post-collisio n schematic of the passenger train. Because of the severity of the collisio n, it is very dif®cult to infer a likely sequence of events. The collisio n with the highway tractor±trailer likely resulted in little structural damage to the locomotive. The lead locomotive impacted the rear wheel of the trailer. The trailer was loaded with approximately 178 kN (40 kips) of steel rebar, a relatively light load. The principal impact was probably with the loaded freight cars; the accident also appeared to have included one or more impacts with the berm on one side of the right of way.
Signi®cant structural damage occurred to the ®rst and second locomotives. The lead locomotive had signi®cant damage on the left side, particularly near the rear. The fuel tank in this locomotive is integral with the centre portion of the frame; i.e. the side sills between the trucks make up most of the fuel tank. There were several punctures and gashes in the fuel tank. The trailing locomotive was extensively damaged. The equipment in the rear third of the locomotive was stripped off and the trailing third of the locomotive frame was bent into the shape of a`W'. A post-accident photograph of the second locomotive is shown in F ig. 5. The most severely damaged passenger car was the second bi-level car, shown in F ig. 6. In the pile-u p, this car received lateral impacts from several other cars and the second locomotive. The rear of the second locomo-tive impacted it near the centre of what is believed to have been the right side. There was a side-to-side impact with another bi-level car opposite the impact with the locomotive. The front of the other bi-level car impacted it on the side near the lead truck.
Qualitative comparisons of the consequences of this accident have been made with analysis results. This accident did show large-amplitude zigzag buckling for the car closest to the impact, as well as smalleramplitude sawtooth buckling for the intermediate cars in the train. The trailing cars remained in line. The structural damage was focused on the cars closest to the impact point. There was very little structural damage to the ®fth passenger car, or to any of the cars behind it. On 9 F ebruary 1996, the cab car of a commuter train, made up of a cab car, four coach cars and a locomotive, struck the locomotive of another commuter train, made up of a locomotive, ®ve coach cars and a cab car. The cab car-led train weighed approximately 3.2 M N (720 kips) and the locomotive-led train weighed approximately 3.6 M N (810 kips). There were three fatalities: the locomotive operator, the operator of the leading cab car and a passenger in the same cab car. There were 12 serio us injuries, all in the leading cab car. F igure 7 illustrates a potential sequence of events during the collisio n, based on conversations with F R A and N TSB of®cials. It appears that the collisio n progressed as follows:
1. The cab car was travelling at approximately 29 km/h (18 mile/h) when it struck the front, right corner of the locomotive, which was travelling at approximately 85 km/h (53 mile/h) in the opposite direction. Based on the track geometry, the angle between the two vehicles at the instant of impact was approximately 78. The corner post on the right side of the cab car struck the right side of the locomotive. Both collisio n posts on the cab car remained in place, though the right post incurred some structural damage. The right corner post was torn away from the cab car. The roof plate from the right side of the cab car broke away and penetrated the window of the locomotive. 2. The cab car raked down the side of the locomotive.
The left rail (®eld side) under the locomotive rolled over and the locomotive derailed. 3. The derailed locomotive pulled the trailing cars off the track. The cab car continued to rake the cars trailin g the locomotive, damaging stairwells as it went. 4. M ost cars in the locomotive-led consist derailed (the last car may have stayed on the track). Only the cab car derailed in the cab car-led consist. The cab car-led consist was stopped by the collisio n at the switch. The locomotive-led consist slid to a stop on the ties and ballast.
D amage occurred principally to the lead vehicles of each of the trains. A portion of the roof of the cab car penetrated the operator's window of the locomotive. D amage to the hood of the locomotive appeared to be due to the portion of the roof riding up on the hood and through the window. Some superstructure damage to the front of the locomotive, approximately halfway between the coupler and the side of the locomotive, appeared to have been caused by the front of the cab car. The main structure of the locomotive remained essentially intact. A post-collisio n photograph of the locomotive is shown in F ig. 8. D amage to the lead cab car includes crushing of the right, front corner of the car from the end of the car to the body bolster. This area includes the operator's compartment and approximately ®ve rows of seats. The right (track-side) end door vertical framing member (collisio n post) incurred substantial damage: there are several large cracks in and around the attachment point. This damage may have occurred when the end of the transverse¯oor member was torn off in the initial collisio n with the locomotive. The collision post itself may not have been loaded directly. A post-collisio n photograph of the cab car is shown in F ig. 9.
Seat frames in the cab car were crushed or missing from the body bolster forward on the side of impact. The seats across the aisle from the crushed seats also incurred substantial damage, due to debris from the collisio n and damage to the¯oor. In all, approximately 25 seat positio ns were destroyed during the collisio n. In areas away from the structurally damaged sections, the seat frames and luggage racks generally remained intact.
Car crush and train collision dynamics models have been developed to simulate the trajectories and crush of the equipment involved during this oblique collisio n [27, 28]. These models have been exercised to evaluate the potential bene®t of modi®cations to the corner structure of the cab car. By increasing the maximum longitudinal load that the corner structure supports at oor level from 667 to 3336 kN (150 to 750 kips), the maximum safe collision speed for the operatorÐthe maximum collisio n speed for which the operator could be expected to surviveÐcan be increased from 14.5 to 29 km/h (9 to 18 mile/h). This increase in corner structure strength is achieved in part by eliminating the end step well and replacing it with a structural element; this increase in strength correspondingly increases the amount of energy that can be absorbed by the crush of the corner structure. The maximum safe speed for the passengersÐthe maximum collision speed for which all the passengers, but not the operator, could be expected to surviveÐincreases from 31 to 51 km/h (19 to 32 mile/h). Efforts are planned to evaluate the potential effectiveness of a completely redesigned end structure.
S ilver S pring, M aryland, 16 February 1996
On 16 F ebruary 1996, a cab car-led commuter train with two coach cars and a locomotive collided nearly headon with an intercity train made up of two locomotives and 15 baggage and passenger cars. The commuter train weighed approximately 2.7 M N (600 kips) and the intercity train weighed approximately 9.6 M N (2200 kips). The lead locomotive of the intercity train was just starting through a switch to an adjacent track, travellin g at approximately 48 km/h (30 mile/h), when it struck the commuter train, travelling at approximately 64 km/h (40 mile/h) in the opposite direction. There were 11 fatalities and 26 injured passengers, all on the commuter train. Three of the fatalities are believed to be the result of the collision and eight are believed to be the result of the post-collision ®re. It appears that the collisio n progressed in several steps, which are illustrated F ig. 10:
1. The lead cab car of the commuter train struck the front of the lead locomotive of the intercity train. The locomotive of the intercity train had just started to traverse a switch, and consequently the cab car and locomotive were misaligned when the collisio n started. The coupler of the cab car was approximately aligned with the side of the locomotive. The cab car subsequently raked along the side of the locomotive, tearing off and rupturin g the locomotive fuel tank. The difference in main structure heights between the locomotive and the cab car allowed the cab car underframe to shear off the equipment hung beneath the underframe of the locomotive and the locomotive underframe to tear the carbody skin above the side sill from the cab car. 2. The impact with the cab car nearly aligned the lead locomotive of the intercity train with the direction of the track, but displaced the cab car laterally (to the right in the ®gure). The front of the lead locomotive of the intercity train struck the front of the second car in the commuter train. This interaction started the front of the lead locomotive of the intercity train to move to the side (towards the left in the ®gure). 3. The lead locomotive of the intercity train separated from its lead truck and began to plow the earth while the second locomotive continued to push. The second locomotive of the intercity train, in combination with the (small) lateral displacement due to the interaction with the second car of the commuter train, acted to turn the lead locomotive of the intercity train clockwise. The impact between the lead locomotive of the intercity train and the second car of the commuter train, in combination with the commuter train being pushed by its locomotive, resulted in the third car of the commuter train derailing (to the right in the ®gure). 4. The front of the lead locomotive of the intercity train continued to plow; the couplers between the lead and second locomotives broke. The lead locomotive eventually turned clockwise approximately 2708. The remaining equipment slid to a stop.
A post-collision photograph of the cab car is shown in F ig. 11. In the photograph, the cab car is sitting on a¯a tcar and the windows visible in the photograph are on the far side of the cab car. The wire frames in the photograph are the metal remains of the seat frames and other interior ®xtures; essentially all non-metal interior components were destroyed in the ®re. There is extensive ®re damage to the car, in addition to the collisio n damage. The structural damage to the second commuter car is similar to the damage done to the cab car, although there is little ®re damage to the second car. The left side of the second car is crushed from the end of the car to the body bolster, although both collisio n posts are intact.
The damage done to the lead locomotive of the intercity train includes puncture of the hood and removal of the equipment hung under the left (track) side of the locomotive, including the fuel tank. There is little damage to any of the main structural components of the locomotive. The operator's cab remained essentially intact, although both windshields were broken. A post-collision photograph of the lead locomotive is shown in F ig. 12. D amage to the second locomotive of the intercit y train occurred after the couplers between the two locomotives broke and the rear of the lead locomotive scraped past the side of the second locomotive and when the second locomotive of the intercit y train hit the locomotive of the commuter train, near the end of the collisio n. The second locomotive of the intercity train was being run backward. N o signi®cant structural damage occurred. Sheet metal damage also occurred at the rear of the second locomotive of the intercity train, apparently due to the collisio n with the locomotive of the commuter train.
M odels to simulate this accident have not been developed. H owever, some of the information from this accident was used in developing the model of the Secaucus accident. In the Silver Spring accident, the main structures did engage, at least brie¯y. U nlike the Secaucus accident, there was damage to the coupler and draft sill of the cab car. Like the Secaucus accident, the impacting locomotive and cab car de¯ected past each other. 
Collisions with objects
The category of collisio ns with objects includes any collisio n between a train and something other than a train, such as a collision with highway vehicles at a grade crossin g, as well as a collision with a displaced intermodal trailer fouling the right of way. Two accidents are described in this section: Indiana, 18 June 1998 [29] 2. Selma, N orth Carolina, 16 M ay 1994 
Portage, Indiana, 18 June 1998
On 18 June 1998, a cab car-led, two-car multiple unit commuter train collid ed with a highway truck trapped at a grade crossing. The highway truck consisted of a tractor with two trailers. The trailers were loaded with coils of sheet steel. The second trailer, the one furthest from the tractor, was stopped on the tracks. The train collided with the second trailer and during the impact a coil of steel broke free and punctured the end of the car. The train weighed approximately 950 kN (220 kips) and was travelling at a speed between 69 and 109 km/h (43 and 68 mile/h) when it hit the highway truck. As a result of the collisio n, three people were killed: a deadheading railroad employee and two passengers. The initia l conditions of the accident are shown schematically in F ig. 13. F igure 14 shows post-accident photographs of the cab car, the highway truck trailer and the coil of steel. The coil of steel weighed approximately 178 kN (40 kips) and was about 1.8 m (6 ft) in diameter. It received little damage during the collisio n. The height of the¯oor of the trailer was several inches below the height of thē oor of the cab car. Owing to the shape of the coil, it moved upward when it hit the end of the cab car. As shown in the photograph, the coil of steel punctured the end of the cab car. The coil stopped inside the cab car after travelling about half its length, destroying about one-quarter of the passenger seats in the car. A simulation model has been developed based on this accident, to evaluate the in¯uence of structural mod-i®cations on the consequences of the accident [8] . The results of analyses conducted with this model indicate that using the lateral end-frame members to support the vertical end frame members can signi®cantly increase the crashworthiness of the cab car. Increased strength of the end structure lateral member near roof level (the anti-telescoping plate) allows more effective distrib ution of the load and the crush among the end structure vertical members when one vertical member is loaded. By integrating the end structure and by increasing the strength of the end door vertical framing members (collisio n posts) by 25 per cent, the maximum safe collisio n speed for the operator can be increased from 19 to 31 km/h (12 to 19 mile/h) in a collisio n simila r to the Portage, Indiana grade crossing collisio n. With the same modi®cations, the maximum safe speed for the passengers can be increased from 32 to 48 km/h (20 to 30 mile/h).
S elma, N orth Carolina, 16 M ay 1994
An overhanging intermodal trailer on the northbound freight train was obstructing the right of way of the southbound intercity passenger train. The passenger train weighed approximately 4.8 M N (1100 kips). The northbound freight train was travelling at approximately 56 km/h (35 mile/h) and the southbound passen-ger train was travelling at about 120 km/h (75 mile/h). The forward trailer, weighing approximately 270 kN (60 kips), on the 51st car was overhanging the southbound track and engaged the lead locomotive of the passenger train. At the onset of contact, the trailer was above the deck and offset outsid e of the collisio n posts of the passenger train lead locomotive. The assistant engineer was killed during the accident and the engineer was severely injured. F igure 15 schematically depicts the conditions that initiated the oblique impact. D amage to the short hood began at the right front corner and extended along the right side to the control compartment. The lead locomotive in the passenger train derailed and rolled over, coming to rest on its left side. All but one of the trailing cars, as well as the second locomotive, left the track, but remained upright. Only the last two cars in the freight train derailed and were damaged. The trailer, which was full of cat litter, burst open, spillin g its contents along the track. Thē atcar carrying the intruding trailer came to rest about 12 m (40 ft) off the track in an upright positio n with the deck and end bent. F igure 16 schematically depicts the conditions immediately after the accident.
F igure 17 illustrates the damage to the locomotive from the impact with the container. The container initially impacted the sheet metal of the short hood approximately 229 mm (9 in) from the side of the locomotive. The damage extended back approximately 2.3 m (7.5 ft). F or approximately the ®rst 1.5 m (5 ft), the principal damage was to the short hood. F or the remaining 0.8 m (2.5 ft), the principal damage included deformation of the sub-base and the sheet metal on the side of the operator's cab. The sub-base was the Potential modi®cations to improve the crashworthiness of locomotive designs have been evaluated with locomotive crush and train collisio n dynamics models, which simulate this oblique collisio n [31, 32]. These modi®cations consist principally of changes in the short hood material properties and thickness. The maximum safe closing speed for the locomotive operator can be increased from 56 to 153 km/h (35 to 95 mile/h) by increasing the maximum crush strength of the short hood when it is loaded on the outboard corner from 445 to 1779 kN (100 to 400 kips).
Single-train events
Single-train events such as derailments can result in the cars rolling on their sides or roofs. Such events are not generally associated with signi®cant structural damage to the cars or loss of occupant volume due to structural crushing of the cars. D erailments can be associated with a large number of injuries and, often depending on the post-derailment conditions, fatalities. Injuries such as those that have occurred during derailments can be mitigated with occupant protection measures. Efforts are underway to understand the environment experienced by the occupants during a derailment better and to develop strategies for protecting the occupants better. Because there has been little structural damage in singletrain events and detailed information on where occupants were and the mechanics of how they were injured has not yet been developed, the accident descriptions in this section are briefer than in preceding sections.
On 22 September 1993, around 2:53 am, a catastrophic accident occurred outside M obile, Alabama, on Big Bayou Canot Bridge [33] . Shortly before the train passed over the bridge, a river barge and tug boat struck the bridge and moved the tracks out of alignment. As a result, many of the cars of the long-haul intercity train ended up in the river; 42 passengers and 5 crewmembers were killed, principally by drowning, and there were also 103 injuries. The train was carrying 220 passengers and crew. Little can be done with traditional occupant protection measures to mitigate the consequences of such an accident.
Single-train events for which occupant protection measures may potentially help to mitigate the consequences include the derailmen t that occurred in Batavia, N ew York, on 3 August 1994 [34] and in K ingman, Arizona, on 9 August 1997 [20] .
In the Batavia accident, the train derailed owing to ā attened rail head. The long-haul intercity train was travelling at 127 km/h (79 mile/h) when it derailed at 3:44 am. As a result of the derailment, most of the cars rolled on to their sides and down an embankment. There were 25 serious injuries; a total of 10 crew and 108 passengers were injured. The train was carrying 19 crewmembers and 320 passengers.
In the K ingman accident, the train derailed owing to washed-out bridge supports. The long-haul intercit y train was travelling at 143 km/h (89 mile/h) when it derailed at 5:56 am. The train remained mostly intact and all the cars remained upright. F our locomotives were hauling the train and the lead three locomotives uncoupled from the rest of the train. After the bridge, the train tore up much of the rails and ties. M any of the cars buckled in the sawtooth pattern. Of 294 passengers, 173 were injured, 24 of them seriously. Of 18 crewmembers, 10 were injured, 1 seriously.
In addition to gathering more information on how occupants are injured during derailments, efforts have also been initiated to determine the decelerations experienced by the occupants and to analyse the response of occupants in the interior during these decelerations. D erailments such as the one in Batavia can generate a large lateral deceleration when the car rolls on to its side and impacts the ground. The interior may present a potentially hostile environment under such circumstances.
DISCUSSION
F atalities and injuries occur in passenger train collisio ns and derailments. In the eleven-year period from 1985 to 1995, 130 people were killed and 6239 people were injured in intercit y and commuter passenger train accidents in the U nited States [35] . There are 0.4 fatalities per billio n passenger-kilometres, in comparison with 6 fatalities per billio n passenger-kilometres for automobiles and 0.15 fatalities per billio n passengerkilometres for aircraft [5] .
The accidents themselves guide efforts to determine how the accidents unfolded and to determine what features may provide improved occupant protection. Statistics do not necessarily provide a good basis for predicting the future. Both the type of accidents and the frequency may vary signi®cantly from the past. Changes in the system, such as increased traf®c, increased equipment speed and increased size, can signi®cantly alter the potential for accidents. Amtrak has recently introduced the high-speed Acela trainset for service from Boston to N ew York to Washington, with speeds up to 240 km/h (150 mile/h). The M aryland Area R ail Commuter Service has recently introduced commuter service at speeds up to 200 km/h (125 mile/h). Commuter rail service has recently been started in Seattle, Washington. Increasing traf®c densit ies, increased equipment speed and increasing size of the passenger rail system continue to generate a high level of concern about collisio n safety.
Ongoing research into rail equipment crashworthiness extends from ®eld investigations of the causes of occupant injury and fatalit y in train accidents to fullscale testing of existing and modi®ed designs under conditions intended to approximate accident conditions. The objective of the ®eld investigations is to develop potential means of increased occupant protection in accidents by determining the types of injuries that occur in train accidents, the locations on the train where the occupants were injured and the mechanisms that potentially caused the injuries. This study is part of the effort to reduce injuries in train accidents.
Information from the accidents that occurred in Bourbonnais, Illinois, and Silver Spring, M aryland, which are both described in this paper, as well as other accidents, has been used to plan a series of tests. These tests are intended to measure the crashworthiness performance of existing design equipment and to measure the performance of equipment incorporating crushable end structures [36] . The collision scenario addressed by these tests is a locomotive-led passenger train colliding with a cab car-led passenger train on tangent track. The tests planned for each equipment type are as follows:
1. Single-car impact into a ®xed barrier 2. Two coupled car impact into a ®xed barrier 3. Cab car-led train collisio n with standing locomotiveled train
The overall objectives of these tests are to demonstrate the effectiveness of (a) improved crashworthiness cab car structural designs, (b) improved crashworthiness coach car structural designs, (c) improved crashworthiness passenger and operator interior con®gurations.
To date, the ®rst two tests for existing-design equipment have been conducted. The third test, to complete the characterization of the performance of existing design equipment in an in-line collisio n, is tentatively planned for July 2001. Testing of improved crashworthiness design equipment, incorporating crushable end structures, is planned to start in the fall of 2002.
A similar series of tests to evaluate the effectiveness of existing equipment and modi®ed equipment under conditions intended to approximate a grade crossin g collisio n is being planned. The test scenario will be based on information from the accident in Portage, Indiana, which is described in this paper, along with information from other accidents.
The information from the crashworthiness research has been used to develop federal safety regulations and industry standards and recommended practices for passenger equipment. It is expected that the results of the ®eld investigations of the causes of occupant injury and fatality in train accidents, the full-scale testing of existing and modi®ed designs under conditions intended to approximate accident conditions and other ongoing research will be used in the future development of N orth American passenger equipment regulations, standards and recommended practices. 
